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Abstract 
 
 
Temporary help services (THS) firms are increasing their hiring of disadvantaged individuals 
and claiming more subsidies for doing so.  Do these subsidies—the Work Opportunity Tax 
Credit (WOTC) and Welfare-to-Work Tax Credit (WtW)—create incentives that improve 
employment outcomes for THS workers? We examine the distinct effects of THS employment 
and WOTC/WtW subsidies using administrative and survey data.  Results indicate that 
WOTC/WtW-certified THS workers have higher earnings than WOTC-eligible but uncertified 
THS workers.  However, these workers have shorter job tenure and lower earnings than 
WOTC/WtW-certified workers in non-THS industries.  Panel estimates suggest that these effects 
do not persist over time. 
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Temporary Help Service Firms’ Use of Employer Tax Credits: 
Implications for Disadvantaged Workers’ Labor Market Outcomes 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, important labor market changes have influenced the employment 
experiences of low-skilled and disadvantaged workers.  One strong trend has been an increase in 
these workers’ participation in the temporary help services employment sector.  As temporary 
help service (THS) employment has increased, THS firms have become increasingly prominent 
labor market intermediaries for disadvantaged groups (Blank 1998; Lane et al. 2003).1  
Furthermore, as the industry more than doubled in size between 1992 and 2000 (Pressler 2002), 
workers with recent participation in public welfare programs came to make up a disproportionate 
share of THS employees, a share that has continued to increase over time (Autor and Houseman 
2005; Barker and Christensen 1998; Heinrich, Mueser, and Troske 2005).   
Another important trend has been an increase in employers’ participation in hiring 
subsidy programs.  The Work Opportunity Tax Credit (WOTC) and Welfare-to-Work Tax Credit 
(WtW) reimburse employers (in the form of federal income tax credits) for up to 50 percent of 
the wages of workers with certain employment barriers, with the objective of helping low-
income and disadvantaged individuals gain labor market experience, improve their work skills, 
and keep their jobs longer.2  In fact, a U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL) publication used to 
market the program attempts to attract employers with the bold headline: “Hiring Welfare 
Recipients Can Reduce Employer Taxes by $8,500 Per New Hire” (http://www.doleta.gov/wtw/ 
                                                 
1 Temporary help services employment increased at a pace five times faster than overall employment 
between 1979 and 1995 (Segal 1996). 
2 The U.S. Department of Labor Web site describes the WOTC as “one tool in a diverse toolbox of flexible 
strategies designed to help move people from welfare to work and gain on-the-job experience” (USDOL 2007).  
Both the WOTC and WtW have been reauthorized approximately every two years; the most recent law expired at 
the end of 2005 but was retroactively reauthorized in December 2006. 
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resources/fact-taxcredits.pdf). Unsurprisingly, certifications of newly hired employees have 
increased since their inception in 1996 (WOTC) and 1997 (WtW), totaling more than 500,000 in 
fiscal year (FY) 2001.  
Little attention has been paid to the fact that an increasing fraction of workers being 
certified for the WOTC or WtW are actually being certified through work at THS firms.  In 
contrast to the legislative intent to subsidize long-term positions, most THS firms are qualified to 
claim the WOTC and WtW subsidies despite their role as labor market intermediaries rather than 
end-user employers.  We investigate how worker outcomes in subsidy-certified THS jobs are 
affected by both the subsidies and the temporary nature of employment.  An empirical 
investigation is particularly important in this case, since economic theory does not offer any clear 
prescriptions about whether THS employment should help these workers; THS firms drive a 
wedge between the worker and his or her employer and have limited legal obligations to their 
workers (such as protection from unjust dismissal) relative to traditional employers.  More 
specifically, we focus on two key questions.  First, do THS firms’ claims of these subsidies 
affect the labor market outcomes of their workers?  Second, among disadvantaged workers in 
subsidized firms, how do the labor market outcomes of THS workers compare to those of 
workers in traditional jobs?  The answers to these questions may help policymakers determine 
whether continuing to subsidize temporary jobs is an effective strategy for improving 
employment outcomes of the disadvantaged. 
There are several interesting parallels between the WOTC/WtW programs and the 
emergence of THS firms as a growing source of employment for public assistance recipients.  
For example, proponents of both would argue that they make employers more willing to hire 
workers that they might not otherwise consider by reducing costs.  In this way, both subsidies 
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and temporary work may allow workers to get a foothold in the labor market, an effect that may 
be magnified when THS firms themselves are subsidized.  However, critics have suggested that 
both employer subsidy programs and THS firms could contribute to worker “churning,” i.e., the 
dismissal of workers whose subsidies run out or the perpetuation of unstable, short-term work 
assignments.  Thus far, there is no evidence of churning as a result of the WOTC and WtW 
programs (U.S. General Accounting Office 2001).3  And although a number of studies of 
temporary workers have shown that they are more likely than other workers to change 
employers, to work fewer and more variable hours, and to have less attachment to the labor 
force, findings on the longer-term implications of temporary employment for disadvantaged 
workers’ labor market outcomes are more mixed.4   In light of the disparate findings, concerns 
persist that these workers may not be obtaining jobs that promote labor market attachment and 
retention, while THS firms are claiming federal tax credits designed for that purpose. 
This is the first study, to our knowledge, to examine the distinct effects of THS 
employment and WOTC/WtW participation on the labor market outcomes of WOTC/WtW-
certified THS workers.5  We use uniquely available administrative data on workers affected by 
the WOTC/WtW and THS employment to investigate these issues, along with a new survey of 
THS firms’ WOTC/WtW awareness and utilization.  Because national statistics do not 
distinguish WOTC/WtW approvals (or “certifications”) by job type, we compiled administrative 
microdata available to us from Wisconsin for our empirical analysis.6  We found that among 
employers in Wisconsin, three of the six firms with the largest number of applications were THS 
                                                 
3 Such effects are difficult to examine because very few workers remain employed long enough to reach the 
subsidy cap or time limit. 
4 See, for example, Autor and Houseman (2005); Blank (1998); Heinrich, Mueser, and Troske (2005); 
Houseman and Polivka (1999); Nollen (1996); Pavetti and Acs (2001); and Segal and Sullivan (1997). 
5 This is known as the effect of “treatment on the treated.”  In this study, we separately estimate the effects 
of THS and WOTC/WtW treatment on workers who experience both treatments. 
6 There is a small sector of the temporary industry that is nonprofit (Seavey 1998) and as such does not 
qualify for the WOTC/WtW, but this is the exception in the industry.     
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employers.  WOTC/WtW applications (and certifications) from THS firms have increased 
steadily over time, expanding from fewer than 16 percent of all applications in 1999 to 26 
percent in 2002.7   
We approach the empirical estimation by comparing labor market outcomes for a sample 
of WOTC/WtW-certified THS workers (the “treatment group”) to two comparison groups: 
workers in the THS industry who are not WOTC/WtW-certified (but are WOTC-eligible), and 
workers who are WOTC/WtW-certified but do not work in the THS industry.  These groups are 
assembled using three sources of administrative data on the population of public assistance 
recipients in Wisconsin over several years.  Our analysis of treatment effects uses econometric 
matching estimation to isolate the effects of WOTC/WtW and THS employment on labor market 
outcomes by controlling for observable factors and also addressing individuals’ selection into 
THS or subsidized employment.  We first examine the effects of the subsidy programs on 
workers in the THS sector.  We hypothesize that if, in fact, the WOTC/WtW programs are 
working as intended, earnings and labor market attachment will be greater among those THS 
workers for whom tax credits are claimed than for those whose employers are not participating, 
all else equal.  Second, we examine the effects of THS employment versus traditional 
employment among WOTC/WtW-certified workers.  We hypothesize that earnings will be lower 
and/or tenure will be shorter for workers in THS jobs.  However, we describe how this 
relationship may be different in the context of subsidized employment, and thus, this 
investigation represents an important new contribution to both the temporary employment and 
tax credit literatures.  
We find large differences in labor earnings and job tenure across the three groups, some 
of which reflect significant (and previously undocumented) differences in worker and employer 
                                                 
7 Based on WI WOTC/WtW administrative data from 1999–2002. 
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characteristics.  Among THS workers, those who are WOTC/WtW-certified have quite similar 
job tenure to eligible unsubsidized workers, but the WOTC/WtW-certified workers have much 
higher earnings per quarter employed; this holds even when we control for observable 
characteristics.  This suggests that some of the WOTC/WtW funds pass through to the THS 
worker in the form of increased earnings per quarter, just as they do (though to a far lesser 
extent) for workers in other industries (Hamersma 2006a).  Using panel estimation to examine 
longer-term outcomes, however, the earnings difference between these workers is no longer 
statistically significant.  Including all WOTC/WtW-certified workers, we find that THS workers 
have much lower total earnings than non-THS workers due to much shorter average job tenure, 
and again, this relationship holds when we control for observable characteristics.  Fortunately for 
these workers, panel estimates show no evidence of continued lower earnings over time.    
In light of the limited information available to us to explain firms’ selection into the 
WOTC/WtW, we added a second component to our study—a telephone survey of Wisconsin 
THS firms—to further investigate their awareness and use of the WOTC and WtW tax credits.  
Among the 101 firms that completed surveys, more than 70 percent were aware of the tax 
credits, and of these, 60 percent reported that they currently claim the tax credits.  Contrary to 
legislative intent, however, only one firm reported that prospective employees’ eligibility for the 
tax credits might affect their hiring decisions.  Thus, our findings suggest that concerns about the 
use of WOTC/WtW funds to subsidize THS employment are likely warranted, since subsidies do 
not appear to improve the job outcomes of disadvantaged workers in these jobs nor encourage 
the hiring of additional disadvantaged workers as intended. 
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THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE WOTC/WTW AND THS EMPLOYMENT 
 The WOTC and WtW subsidy programs are the most recent in a long line of wage 
subsidy programs designed to improve work outcomes among the disadvantaged.  They are most 
similar to the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit (TJTC), which operated from 1978 until 1994.  The 
TJTC allowed employers to claim subsidies for workers in several target groups, including 
certain welfare recipients, food stamp recipients, disabled individuals, and disadvantaged youth.  
The WOTC program, like the TJTC, is a one-year subsidy involving several target groups; we 
focus on welfare recipients and food stamp youth (ages 18–24).8  Under the WOTC, the tax 
credit is 40 percent of wages, up to a maximum credit of $2,400, as long as the employee works 
for at least 400 total hours at the firm.  The credit is 25 percent of wages if the employee works 
at least 120 but fewer than 400 hours and is zero otherwise.  The WtW program applies 
specifically to workers with at least 18 months of welfare receipt who work 400 hours per year 
or more.  It is administered exactly like the WOTC but involves a subsidy of 35 percent in the 
first year of employment (maximum credit $3,500) and 50 percent in the second year (maximum 
credit $5,000).   
Employers can participate in these programs by applying for subsidy certification for any 
new worker they hire.  Participating employers typically assess eligibility by including a short 
WOTC prescreening form in workers’ application or new-hire materials.  This pre-screening 
form, along with a one-page subsidy application, must be completed and signed on or before the 
date of hire.  The employer must then submit them to the state (along with fairly minimal 
                                                 
8 Eligibility for the WOTC through welfare receipt requires that workers have been welfare recipients for at 
least 9 of the last 18 months.  The food-stamp youth category includes workers 18–24 years old who have received 
food stamps for the past 6 months or have received food stamps for 3 of the last 5 months (if the family has since 
become ineligible).  Other target groups are low-income ex-felons, vocational rehabilitation clients, poor veterans, 
high-risk youth (who live in economically distressed areas), Supplemental Security Income recipients, and high-risk 
youth with summer jobs (who qualify for a different subsidy level due to having shorter-term jobs).  Some target 
group definitions were modified for the program as of January 2007, but these do not affect the time period we study 
here.  
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documentation) within 21 days of hire.  Upon approval from the state, the employer is authorized 
to claim the WOTC or WtW tax credits on its federal tax return.9  Note that in the case of THS 
employment, the legal employer is the THS firm; it is subject to the same time limits and subsidy 
rates as other firms regardless of whether the worker has multiple job assignments during an 
employment spell with the firm. 
The limited research on the WOTC and WtW suggests a low level of participation among 
firms that is not well understood.  Hamersma (2003) estimates that fewer than one-third of 
eligible welfare recipients and fewer than 18 percent of food-stamp youth were claimed by their 
employers for the credits.  The General Accounting Office reported that the employers most 
likely to claim the subsidies are large firms that qualify for over $100,000 per year in 
WOTC/WtW tax credits (U.S. GAO 2002).   
In a study of the Wisconsin welfare population, Hamersma (2006a) used matching 
estimation to assess the effects of the WOTC/WtW on employment, wages, and job tenure.  The 
results indicate that employment probabilities do not measurably improve when workers become 
eligible for the programs.10  However, within the WOTC/WtW-eligible population, those whose 
employers participate have about 10 percent higher earnings per quarter than similar 
unsubsidized workers (though average job tenure is unaffected).  These small to nonexistent 
effects are consistent with the previous literature on targeted employer tax credits.11    
Research investigating the influence of the THS industry on the employment patterns of 
the disadvantaged is also relatively new, reflecting the recent growth of employment in the 
                                                 
9 Additional details about WOTC/WtW administration are available in Hamersma (2003).  
10 This is likely related to the low WOTC/WtW participation rate among prospective employers.   
11 Hollenbeck and Willke (1991), for example, evaluate the longest-running program, the Targeted Jobs 
Tax Credit (TJTC).  They do not find statistically significant impacts of TJTC certification on employment or job 
retention but report positive wage impacts for most worker groups.  The inspector general of the USDOL similarly 
concludes that the TJTC was not “an effective means of helping target group members find employment” and 
recommends that the program be discontinued (USDOL 1994).  Katz (1998), alternatively, finds a modest positive 
employment effect for disadvantaged young adults; he does not examine wages or tenure. 
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industry.  A primary concern for this study is the overrepresentation of public assistance 
recipients among THS employees.  In recent work, Heinrich, Mueser, and Troske (2005) study 
the populations of welfare recipients in Missouri and North Carolina and find that the proportion 
with jobs in the temporary help services sector more than doubled between 1993 and 1997.12  
Among Autor and Houseman’s (2005) sample of welfare-to-work clients in Michigan, 21 
percent who found jobs were working for temporary help agencies.  In fact, THS firms are 
registered providers of welfare-to-work services in a number of states.13 
 There is considerable evidence that the increasing participation of the disadvantaged in 
THS employment may be a cause for concern.  Temporary workers are paid lower wages than 
permanent employees in the same positions, and they are more likely to be underemployed and 
to work fewer hours (Blank 1998; Houseman and Polivka 1999; Nollen 1996; Segal and Sullivan 
1997).  Temporary help service jobs seem to lack some of the attributes that other research 
suggests are critical to welfare recipients’ successful transition from welfare to stable 
employment—secure income, training opportunities, health insurance benefits, and paid time off 
(Blank 1998; Cohany 1998; Jorgenson and Riemer 2000; Morris and Vekker 2001).  Some have 
also criticized THS firm arrangements specifically because they sever the traditional employer-
employee relationship between workers and client firms on whose premises they work.  Studies 
by Miles (2000) and Autor (2003), for example, link the growth of temporary jobs to THS firms’ 
exemption from legal protections against unjust dismissal of workers.14  Temporary help service 
                                                 
12 Of those welfare recipients employed in the first quarter of 1999, over 13 percent in Missouri and over 17 
percent in North Carolina were working in temporary help jobs.  These numbers are substantial, since just over 2 
percent of the general working population works in the THS sector. 
13 Note that Wisconsin is not one of these states. 
14 Another difference is reflected in benefit provision; for example, Cohany (1998) finds that whereas 61 
percent of permanent workers have health insurance, only 7 percent of temporary workers receive this benefit.   
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firms can end job placements without firing workers, and they have no obligation to provide a 
job assignment at any time. 
Of course, as we also noted earlier, there is an alternative understanding of THS 
employment that suggests that disadvantaged workers are more likely to take these jobs because 
they best match their preferences or skills.  Segal and Sullivan (1997) and Carre (1992) show 
that a large portion of the temporary/permanent wage gap can be explained by worker 
characteristics and by the higher concentration of low-skilled workers in occupations mediated 
by THS firms (i.e., relatively low-wage administrative, clerical, and laborer jobs).  Heinrich, 
Mueser, and Troske (2005) suggest that for these workers with less desirable characteristics, the 
ability to enter into a contract where the employer has no long-term obligation may facilitate 
their access to the labor market and possibly lead to permanent jobs if workers demonstrate high 
productivity.  If this is, in fact, a beneficial service that THS firms provide, any additional 
encouragement that WOTC/WtW subsidies might give to THS firms could produce net benefits 
for participants and society in the form of reduced public assistance obligations.   
Economic theory provides only limited help in modeling the interaction of THS 
employment with the WOTC subsidies and predicting the anticipated effects of each of them.  
For example, a typical model of subsidies predicts increased earnings (due to subsidy pass-
through) and perhaps longer job tenure (in cases where the subsidy increases with time on the 
job).15  Both effects are likely to improve labor force attachment in general.  However, in the 
case of THS workers these predictions are less clear.  There is a wedge between the worker and 
his or her employer (the THS firm), both in terms of pay—since a portion of the wages paid by 
the client firm go to the THS firm rather than the worker—and in terms of productivity, which 
                                                 
15 The tenure effect is not completely clear in the case of the WOTC if less-skilled workers are more likely 
to get hired, since these workers may be more likely to be fired than the average worker.  See Hamersma (2006a) for 
a search model illustrating this point. 
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may be hard for the THS firm to directly observe.  This muddies the usual prediction of 
increased earnings for the worker.  The tenure incentives are also more unwieldy in the context 
of THS work.  There is substantial uncertainty as to whether workers will reach the minimum 
hours requirement to qualify for a subsidy, since workers may decline assignments and client 
firms may cancel contracts.    
The typical expected effects of a THS job are likewise potentially different in the context 
of subsidized employment.  While we would still expect the usual shorter tenure (due to the 
nature of the work), firms with very short average tenure may be less likely to participate in 
subsidy programs; this means the effect may be smaller in our sample of WOTC-participating 
firms.  Predicting an earnings effect is difficult (even in the absence of a subsidy) because the 
compensating differential for a THS job may be positive or negative, depending on whether the 
worker suffers or benefits from the temporary arrangement.  In effect, this becomes an empirical 
question that we address for the population of subsidized workers.   
Moreover, this population of subsidized workers provides a convenient, more 
homogeneous sample than a typical study comparing THS and non-THS workers.  The firms that 
participate in the WOTC tend to be large, national firms that provide support for processing the 
WOTC paperwork, and the workers qualified for the WOTC must have particular public 
assistance records, so both firms and workers are relatively homogeneous.  This lessens 
econometric problems associated with controlling for differences among workers selecting into 
THS employment. 
 
DATA   
Research on the effects of federal employer tax credit programs, including the WOTC 
and WtW tax credits, has been limited by data access problems.  The state labor agencies that are 
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responsible for certifying workers’ eligibility do not keep records of hours or earnings for these 
workers, since the responsibility for auditing the amount of subsidy claimed belongs to the 
Internal Revenue Service.16  Thus there is no single source of data that includes both certification 
information and labor market outcomes. 
In Wisconsin, we have the opportunity to take advantage of a unique combination of data 
sets that provides us with the information needed to evaluate subsidy eligibility, identify certified 
workers, and examine labor market outcomes over time.  We combine information from three 
key databases: the Wisconsin Client Assistance for Re-employment and Economic Support 
(CARES) database with demographic and monthly public assistance receipt data, Wisconsin’s 
WOTC/WtW program database, and matching Unemployment Insurance (UI) data on quarterly 
earnings and industry.  Together, these merged data contain records documenting TANF and 
food stamp receipt, demographic characteristics, and earnings for the universe of individuals who 
received any Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) or food stamps during the 
period 1998–2001, along with WOTC/WtW information for the subset of these recipients whose 
employers applied for the tax credits. The WOTC/WtW database provides worker-level 
information about all WOTC/WtW applications submitted by firms, including workers’ target 
groups and whether a certification was granted. 17  The UI earnings data include North American 
Industry Classification System (NAICS) industry codes by which we can distinguish THS 
employers from typical firms.  Because determination of WOTC/WtW eligibility via TANF 
receipt requires 18 months of prior data, much of our analysis is focused on workers who began a 
                                                 
16 Incidentally, even if company tax forms were available, the IRS requires only an aggregate tax credit 
claim from each employer, so the data would not identify the particular workers claimed or even the number of 
workers claimed by a given firm. 
17 Note that some of the workers who qualified for WOTC via welfare or food stamps may also have 
qualified under other target groups.  We assume that the wage or job duration effects of a certification (for someone 
eligible via welfare/food stamps) are the same regardless of which target group was listed on the WOTC application.  
However, we do allow selection into a THS job (among WOTC-certified workers from any target group) to be 
related to the target group listed. 
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WOTC or THS job during July 1999–December 2001.18  Unemployment Insurance data for this 
group extends from 1995 through the second quarter of 2004.   
In addition to these administrative data, we administered a short telephone survey to 
Wisconsin THS firms over a period of three weeks (September 16–October 6, 2005) to collect 
information about their awareness and use of the WOTC and WtW tax credits.  A total of 224 
THS firms were randomly selected from a sample frame of approximately 300 THS firms in 36 
Wisconsin cities.19  Of these 224 firms to which calls were attempted, we did not get an answer 
or were unable to complete a call back for 66, and 18 were disconnected/wrong numbers or the 
firm was no longer in business.  Among the other 140 firms, 31 declined to participate and 8 
referred us to an out-of-state corporate office, yielding 101 completed surveys and a 72 percent 
response rate for those firms with which we were able to make voice contact. The survey 
questions and additional information are in an appendix available from the authors upon request. 
 
DESCRIPTIVE AND CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSIS 
 Our administrative data provide a unique opportunity to explore the characteristics of 
public assistance recipients by subgroup according to their WOTC/WtW certification status and 
their THS or non-THS employment status.  This descriptive analysis, which examines worker 
demographics, firm characteristics, and labor market outcomes, allows us to see which groups of 
workers are most likely to be affected by WOTC/WtW policy and its interaction with THS 
employment.  It also underscores the importance of controlling for these factors when we attempt 
to identify the effects of THS employment and WOTC/WtW certification. 
                                                 
18 Eligibility via welfare receipt requires welfare receipt in at least 9 of the last 18 months. 
19 In some cases, multiple firms in our sample are branch offices of the same larger company.  We 
interviewed them separately, since they may have different WOTC/WtW practices. 
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We present descriptive statistics in three tables.  In Table 1, we focus exclusively on 
workers who obtained a job at a THS firm during July 1999–December 2001 and who were 
WOTC/WtW-eligible or WOTC/WtW-certified via welfare or food stamp receipt.20  In Tables 
2A and 2B, we present descriptive statistics for WOTC/WtW-certified workers only, dividing the 
sample according to THS status to better understand the differences between THS and non-THS 
workers among the WOTC/WtW-certified.  Table 2A contains data on a large number of 
WOTC/WtW recipients (from all target groups) whose WOTC/WtW jobs began in 1999–2002, 
providing some information about the firm at which they were hired, their target group, and their 
wages and occupation.  Table 2B provides demographic characteristics for the subgroup of the 
sample on which we focus our analysis: certified workers during July 1999–December 2001 who 
had welfare/food stamp records sometime during 1998–2001.  Since WOTC and WtW are 
administered via the same process, with WtW targeting a more narrow subgroup of workers, we 
treat WtW as an additional WOTC target group in our analysis and will refer to the programs 
simply as WOTC.21 
Beginning with Table 1, we provide separate statistics for WOTC-eligible THS workers 
who were certified for the WOTC and those who were not certified.  We also provide some 
limited characteristics of the THS firm at which the worker is employed.  The sample means 
indicate several patterns in the characteristics of WOTC-certified workers in THS firms relative 
to their uncertified counterparts.  First, WOTC-certified workers are more often white (28.6 
percent) than eligible uncertified workers (12.3 percent).  They also tend to be more likely to 
                                                 
20 We assess eligibility according to the WOTC guidelines for the welfare and food stamp target groups.  
Welfare recipients must have at least 9 months of receipt in the last 18 months and food stamp youth must (a) have 
received food stamps for the last 6 months and (b) be between the ages of 18 and 24 at the time of hire. 
21 Any worker who qualifies for WtW also qualifies for WOTC (because welfare receipt requirements are 
stricter).  Firms are allowed to apply for both credits but may claim only one; thus, a worker who qualified for WtW 
may be ultimately claimed under WOTC if it is advantageous.  This will often be the case when job duration is 
short; see Hamersma (2006b) for details on the distribution of job duration among WOTC/WtW workers. 
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have finished high school; only 42.2 percent are dropouts versus 59.6 percent of uncertified 
workers.  Milwaukee workers and those with larger numbers of children are less likely to be 
certified.  The last two characteristics listed in Table 1 reflect differences in firm characteristics 
of certified and uncertified workers.  WOTC-certified workers are more likely to be found in 
THS firms that are headquartered out of state, perhaps because firms that operate at the national 
or international level tend to be larger and therefore have more to gain from participating in the 
WOTC.  However, when we measure the size of the THS firm’s “disadvantaged workforce” in 
Wisconsin over the time period of interest, we find that WOTC-certified workers tend to come 
from slightly smaller firms than their uncertified counterparts.22       
Tables 2A and 2B show that there are several statistically significant differences between 
WOTC workers at end-user firms and WOTC workers employed in the temporary help industry, 
a few of which are particularly notable.  First, Table 2A reveals that THS firms certify a 
disproportionately high percentage of low-income ex-felons among their WOTC workers (about 
25 percent) relative to the average among non-THS firms (less than 7 percent).  There are also 
other smaller differences across the two groups in the size of each target group, suggesting that 
the target group may be a strong predictor of the type of employment (THS or non-THS) that a 
worker obtains.23   
                                                 
22 We estimate “disadvantaged workforce size” by counting, for each firm, the number of person-quarter UI 
records (in 1999:1–2004:2) for workers who received welfare or food stamps in Wisconsin at some point in 1998–
2001 (our CARES sample) or for whom the employer applied for WOTC certification.  It is possible that some firms 
that appear “small” are actually large national firms that happen to have relatively few disadvantaged workers 
located in Wisconsin.  
23 The extremely large difference in the ex-felon category also indicates that there may be more work to be 
done on understanding the particular effects of the WOTC and of THS employment on this subgroup of the 
population, given the growing numbers of ex-felons among the low-skilled population.  The difference is even more 
stunning here because the low-income ex-felon target group is known as one of the hardest to successfully certify 
due to some issues regarding proof of “low-income” (recently addressed in the December 2006 WOTC legislation).  
This means that if someone qualified for both the ex-felon target group and another, the employer would be likely to 
claim them under the other group, so our data may understate the number of ex-felons being certified for the WOTC.  
Unfortunately, our available sample sizes preclude a separate analysis of ex-felons.  
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Second, the starting wages of THS workers are generally higher, as seen in the relatively 
larger proportions of THS workers in the higher wage categories; almost 40 percent of THS 
workers are paid $8.00 or more per hour, while only about 17 percent of non-THS workers are in 
this wage range.  Some of this disparity may be explained by differences in occupation, although 
the broad categories available in Table 2A provide limited insight into whether this may be the 
case (particularly because about 32 percent of THS workers and 18 percent of non-THS workers 
have occupations coded as simply “other”).  A more likely explanation of the wage differential 
may be related to education level, as provided in Table 2B.  THS workers who are certified for 
the WOTC tend to be more educated than other WOTC workers, with almost 59 percent having 
at least a high school degree compared to only 49 percent among non-THS workers. 
Third, Table 2B indicates that THS workers are more likely to be male and tend to be 
slightly older and have fewer children than their non-THS counterparts.  This may reflect the 
flexibility required by THS jobs.  Although some studies have suggested that the flexibility 
associated with THS jobs might also be appealing to women with families (e.g., the ability to 
decline inconvenient assignments), other research (discussed earlier) documents the challenges 
mothers face in arranging child care and accommodating changing work schedules.   
 Since our focus in this analysis is on employment outcomes, we provide statistics on 
workers’ employment outcomes at the job of interest (by THS and WOTC subgroup) in Table 3.  
The table reveals two strong trends.  First, WOTC certification has limited association with 
average tenure among THS workers, but it is strongly associated with much higher quarterly 
earnings (averaging $2,868 among the certified compared to $1,656 among the uncertified).  
Second, work at a THS firm is associated with lower tenure among WOTC workers (2.03 
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quarters versus 3.07 quarters), but average earnings per quarter worked are very similar for THS 
and non-THS WOTC workers.24   
Is it possible that these differences in labor outcomes are completely driven by 
differences in the observable characteristics of these groups?  Our analysis of these data suggests 
that this is not the case.  When we control for key characteristics using cross-sectional matching 
estimation, the same patterns remain.25  We find that WOTC-certified THS workers have 
earnings of about $255 more than their eligible but uncertified THS counterparts.  We also 
continue to see shorter tenure among the THS than among non-THS workers within the WOTC-
certified sample.  The negative estimated difference in tenure is a statistically significant 1.21 
quarters, which is quite large given that the mean tenure in the sample is about 3 quarters and is 
the main reason that quarterly earnings are also lower for this group.26  These differences may 
reflect the effects of WOTC certification and THS employment “treatments,” but it is also 
possible that firms and workers select into each of these treatments based on unobserved 
characteristics.  If these unobserved characteristics are related to earnings and labor force 
attachment, the estimated differences may not be direct effects of the treatment.  The following 
section provides an econometric evaluation of the interaction of WOTC with THS employment 
that takes into account these selection issues. 
 
                                                 
24 All differences across cells in Table 3 are statistically significant with at least 95 percent confidence.  
25 Matching estimation is described in more detail in the next section.  The control variables used here are 
the same as those used for the panel regressions described in that section.   The cross-sectional results referenced 
here are available in more detail upon request.  
26 For WOTC-certified workers, the data provide workers’ starting hourly wages (in one-dollar-wide 
categories).  Assigning each worker the midpoint of their reported category, and controlling for observables using 
matching, we find that hourly wages are about $1 per hour higher for THS workers.  This is not enough to 
compensate for the shorter tenure. 
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PANEL MATCHING ESTIMATION OF THE EFFECTS OF WOTC/THS 
INTERACTION 
 
 We use a panel version of the econometric method of matching to address the two key 
issues of this paper: the labor market effects of the WOTC on workers in the THS sector, and the 
labor market effects of THS employment (relative to traditional employment) on workers who 
are certified for the WOTC.  The matching estimator for treatment effects was introduced to the 
economics literature in a series of papers published in the late 1990s by economists Heckman, 
Ichimura, Smith, and Todd (Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd 1997, 1998; Heckman et al. 1998).  
This methodology, which originated in the statistics literature (see, for example, Rosenbaum and 
Rubin 1983), allows estimation of treatment effects in contexts where there is nonrandom 
selection into treatment.  This is a key feature for our purposes, since workers select into THS 
employment and firms select into WOTC participation.  Matching also generates estimates with 
more limited functional-form assumptions than many other estimators, since part of the 
estimation is nonparametric.  In addition, matching deals explicitly with the so-called “common 
support” problem, in which some treated individuals have no observationally similar 
counterparts among the untreated and thus cannot be reasonably used in estimation of treatment 
effects.27  And finally, Heckman et al. (1998) emphasize that matching works best when both 
treatment and comparison groups are from the same local labor markets, which is also a feature 
of our data.   
 The matching estimator is consistent for the effect of interest, called the treatment on the 
treated, which can be expressed as  
E(Y1 – Y0 | D = 1), 
                                                 
27 Typical regression analyses seldom address this issue and instead include these observations. 
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where Y1 is the labor market outcome in the presence of treatment, Y0 is the outcome in its 
absence, and D = 1 indicates treatment (WOTC participation or THS employment).28  The 
general approach of matching is to estimate counterfactuals for each treated person so that his or 
her treated outcome (which is observed) can be compared to what would have happened in the 
absence of treatment (which we estimate using the comparison group). 
Although more flexible than linear regression, matching still requires a maintained 
assumption about the relationship between the treated and untreated.  Cross-sectional matching is 
valid only if, after controlling for observable characteristics X, a person’s ultimate treatment 
status is not related to what their outcome would have been in the absence of treatment.  In other 
words, people select into treatment based on observables only.  In order to relax this assumption, 
we use a panel version of the matching estimator that allows a time-invariant (unobserved) 
difference in outcomes between the treated and untreated.  These estimates use dependent 
variables defined as the difference between pre- and posttreatment outcomes for each individual.  
The following mean-independence assumption must hold for the periods t (before treatment) and 
t’ (after treatment): 
 
E(Y0t’ – Y0t | D = 1, X) = E(Y0t’ – Y0t | D = 0, X) for X ε S, 
 
where S is defined as the overlapping support among the treatment and comparison groups.29  
This assumption implies that the outcome trajectories of the treatment and comparison groups 
                                                 
28 The intuition behind the simplest version of matching is straightforward. The method divides a sample 
into cells within which there is little variation in observable characteristics that may influence selection into 
treatment and/or outcomes.  The outcomes of the treated and untreated are compared within each cell. Cells in which 
either all individuals are treated (or all untreated) are discarded, as they cannot provide information on the effects of 
treatment (Angrist and Krueger 1999).  The final estimator is a weighted average of the estimated within-cell 
WOTC effects, where the greatest weight is put on cells with high proportions of treated individuals.   
29 The observable characteristics X are presumed to be drawn from a distribution with some minimum and 
maximum draws defining the bounds on each variable’s support.  These distributions are allowed to differ between 
the treatment and comparison groups, so that the support for a given variable in X may differ between the two 
groups.  The region of overlapping support is the intersection of these supports, i.e., it excludes any range of X 
values that could only be drawn by one group and not the other. 
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must match, but their outcome levels are allowed to differ by an unobserved constant.  For 
example, this assumption can hold even if the people who select into THS employment have 
lower wage levels in all periods due to something unobservable about them.  This panel version 
of the matching estimator often performs better than its cross-sectional counterpart, perhaps 
because it allows for this unobserved heterogeneity (see, for example, Heckman et al. 1998). 
The common application of matching we use, called propensity score matching, is a two-
step process in which we first estimate the probability of treatment based on the conditioning 
variables.  By generating predicted probabilities of treatment (i.e., propensity scores), we reduce 
the matching process to the one-dimensional problem of comparing treated and untreated 
workers with similar propensity scores (rather than requiring matches on all of the X variables).30  
Upon estimation of the propensity score, we perform the matching estimation by comparing the 
outcome trajectory of each treated person to a weighted average of the outcome trajectories of 
untreated people with similar propensity scores.  To make this weighted average an appropriate 
counterfactual for a given treated person, the highest weight is placed on those untreated people 
with propensity scores most similar to the treated individual.  We use nonparametric local-linear 
regression (similar to a kernel estimator) to calculate and apply these weights, which produces an 
estimated treatment effect for each treated individual without imposing functional-form 
assumptions on the relationship between the propensity scores and the outcomes.31  These 
individual effects are averaged to form the overall treatment-effect estimate.     
 
                                                 
30 Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that as long as the mean independence assumption holds for 
matching on X, it will also be valid for matching on the propensity score P(X). 
31 Smith and Todd (2005) provide a detailed explanation of this method, which takes each treated 
observation and estimates a full set of weights for the comparison group in order to construct a person-specific 
estimate of what their untreated outcome would have been. 
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The Effects of the WOTC on THS Workers 
 We use the sample of THS workers who were WOTC-eligible or WOTC-certified (from 
Table 1) to investigate the effects of the WOTC within the THS industry.32  As we discovered 
earlier, there are a number of worker and firm characteristics that are associated with WOTC 
certification.  Many of these factors, such as education, are also likely to influence wages and job 
tenure.  We include these variables in the propensity score estimation reported in Table 4.    
 The results of the propensity score estimation reflect some of the patterns we observed in 
our earlier tabulations.  Workers who are older, white, or more highly educated are significantly 
more likely to be WOTC certified than younger, minority, or less educated workers.  The effect 
of the number of children is negative, which is consistent with Table 1.  In addition, Milwaukee 
residents and workers at firms headquartered in Wisconsin are less likely to become WOTC 
certified.  Finally, higher typical earnings at the firm for all of their disadvantaged workers (in 
the past year) are predictive of higher earnings for the THS worker being observed.    
 Using these propensity scores in the matching estimation, we examine the effects of 
WOTC certification on the earnings and job tenure of THS workers who are WOTC-eligible.  
Since the panel estimation requires each worker’s outcomes to be measured both before and after 
treatment in order to control for time-invariant unobservables, we must choose broad measures 
of earnings and tenure that are not specific to the THS job of interest (which, by definition, isn’t 
observed in prior periods).  We choose to examine total earnings and total quarters employed in 
all jobs for periods up to two years before and after the start date at the job of interest.33  This 
incorporates the outcomes at the job of interest into a broader measure of earnings growth and 
                                                 
32 The sample used here is slightly smaller than that used in Table 1; see the Table 4 notes. 
33 There is, for example, no clear prior outcome such as “previous period’s wage at a THS job” to subtract 
from the wage at the current THS job. 
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labor force attachment extending (in many cases) to time periods subsequent to the end of that 
particular job.  
 For our application of panel matching, we use local linear regression to create a 
counterfactual change in earnings and tenure for each WOTC-certified worker, predicted by a 
weighted average of workers with similar propensity scores who were WOTC-eligible but not 
certified.  The difference between this counterfactual and the worker’s actual change in outcomes 
is attributed to the effects of the WOTC program.  These differences are averaged across workers 
to generate an estimate of the average effect of treatment on the treated.  Table 5 contains these 
results, which are estimated separately for the first year and the second year after the THS job 
begins. 
 We do not find much evidence that being certified for the WOTC brings about 
improvements in workers’ job outcomes during these two years.  While the bottom panel of 
Table 5 shows positive point estimates of the effect of the WOTC on earnings, these are 
imprecisely estimated so we cannot reject the hypothesis of no effect.  Similarly, we do not find 
evidence of any WOTC effects on labor force attachment as measured by quarters worked per 
year.  In fact, while the sign of any effect cannot be determined, the small coefficients (0.071 and 
0.141) combined with their standard errors (0.099 and 0.114, respectively) suggest that any large 
effect in either direction is quite unlikely.34  We therefore find no support for the hypothesis that 
the WOTC provides a “foot in the door” for THS workers to improve future outcomes beyond 
the WOTC job.  This is consistent with the findings in Hamersma (2006a) that overall earnings 
and labor force attachment do not appear to be affected by WOTC certification.  The results 
could reflect the limited scope of the subsidy or a broader general equilibrium effect that 
equalizes wages over time. 
                                                 
34 Note that the mean annual quarters worked in the sample is roughly 2.5. 
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The Effects of THS Employment on WOTC/WtW Workers 
 We use the sample of WOTC workers (from Table 2B) to investigate the effects of THS 
employment among WOTC recipients.35  Since particular demographic characteristics and target 
group information proved to be associated with selection into THS employment, we include 
those characteristics in the propensity score estimation shown in Table 6.     
 Selection into THS employment among WOTC-certified workers appears to depend 
heavily on worker demographic characteristics.  Similarly to selection into the WOTC, workers 
who are older, male, or more highly educated are more likely to work in THS jobs than workers 
who are younger, female, or less-educated.  The effects of race are not precisely estimated.  
Target group is a strong predictor of THS employment among WOTC workers, as expected; the 
effect of ex-felon status is particularly large.  Relative to the reference occupation 
(professional/technical/managerial), workers in all other occupations are more likely to be in 
THS jobs, particularly if they are in the service or other (nonclerical/sales) sectors.  The signs on 
the other coefficients are generally consistent with the patterns from Table 2B.   
 As before, we use these propensity scores to nonparametrically estimate the effects of 
treatment, which in this case is THS employment.  We continue to look at total earnings and 
quarters employed for the first year after job start and the second year after job start.  Of course, 
many workers had additional jobs during this period that were not with THS firms.  This means 
we are simply examining the effect of one particular THS job on a worker’s future earnings and 
labor force attachment, wherever they may work.  This corresponds to our policy interest in 
understanding whether THS employment might place WOTC workers on a different labor 
market trajectory than typical employment.   
                                                 
35 The sample used here is slightly smaller than that used in Table 2B; a discussion of the dropped 
observations in included in the Table 6 notes. 
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 Table 7 reports the panel estimates of the effects of THS employment on WOTC 
workers.  While none of the individual estimates are statistically significant, there is an 
interesting pattern: in measures of both annual earnings and quarters worked, the estimate for the 
second year after the WOTC job begins is (statistically) significantly larger than the estimate for 
the first year.  This may reflect “recovery” from the downward shock of the (usually) low-
earnings THS job.  Since the estimates cannot individually be distinguished from zero, we cannot 
make any inference about whether this “recovery” results in long-term improvement of labor 
market outcomes, whether workers merely “break even” after the low earnings at the THS job, or 
whether workers continue to fall short of their pre-THS job level of earnings and employment.   
 
Check of Assumptions in Matching Estimation 
The validity of the panel matching results rests on the assumption that, conditional on 
observable characteristics, the expected change in one’s outcome in the absence of treatment 
does not depend on one’s treatment status.  As Lee (2006) elaborates, the primary function of the 
propensity score is to serve as a balancing score, and thus, the purpose of the balancing test is to 
confirm that the propensity score adequately performs this role. Equivalently, there should be no 
other variable that could be added to the conditioning set of the propensity score models that 
would improve our estimation, and after the application of matching, there should be no 
statistically significant differences between covariate means of the treatment and comparison 
groups.  This latter point is important, as only “after-matching” tests compare differences in 
time-invariant covariates (that are unaffected by treatment) for the resulting matched sample. 
The results of balancing tests for the estimation of selection into THS employment (Table 
A.1) suggest that the propensity score estimation performed very well in balancing the covariates 
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between treatments (those who take temporary jobs) and comparison group members.36  Bias 
was substantially reduced for all covariates, and there were no statistically significant differences 
between treatment and comparison group members after matching.  The balancing tests results 
for selection into the WOTC performed equally well (Table A.2); again, there were no 
statistically significant differences between treatment and comparison group members after 
matching. The success of the propensity scores in balancing differences between treatment and 
control group members in both samples implies that we should interpret our panel matching 
results with confidence; that is, the selection mechanisms in these cases have been appropriately 
modeled and any biases associated with selective differences have been effectively reduced.37   
 
FINDINGS FROM A SURVEY OF WISCONSIN THS FIRMS 
 Given that relatively little is understood about why some firms choose (or choose not) to 
claim tax credits for disadvantaged workers, and moreover, since even less is understood about 
whether such incentives might differ for THS firms, we decided to supplement our empirical 
analysis with a survey of THS firms to inquire about their awareness and use of the WOTC and 
WtW tax credits.  Our survey of 101 THS firms in Wisconsin showed that more than 70 percent 
were aware that they could claim the WOTC and WtW tax credits, and 60 percent of these were 
currently claiming tax credits.  When asked if they knew what qualifications or characteristics an 
                                                 
36 We used the Stata pstest command after matching to perform the balancing tests.  Although pstest is not 
useful for default local linear regression matching, we alter the kernel (to biweight), and thus, local linear regression 
loops over the treatment observations to calculate the smoothed outcome and takes into account which observations 
were used in calculating the counterfactual.  (We thank Edwin Leuven for his technical assistance with this point.)  
The detailed results of the balancing tests are available from the authors upon request. 
 
37 Of course, the matching procedure and balancing tests do not allow us to rule out lingering unobserved 
differences between the treatment and comparison groups.  A set of procedures recently developed by Altonji, Elder, 
and Taber (2005) facilitate a test of the extent to which unobserved variables might explain away any estimated 
effects (after matching), under strict assumptions on the relationship between observed and unobserved factors.  This 
test is not particularly useful in our case, as once we apply panel matching methods to our data (which control for 
individual heterogeneity), we do not find any statistically significant effects of being WOTC-certified or in 
temporary help employment. 
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individual had to possess for their firm to claim the tax credits, many indicated that they used a 
form (e.g., with a registration or new hire packet) to screen for those who might qualify.38  About 
one-half of the WOTC-participating THS firms offered additional information about the 
processes they used to claim the credits, and of these, most (24) firms reported that they 
submitted forms to a corporate office and/or a third-party firm to process the applications for tax 
credits.  Only a few firms had any idea about the quantity or value of claims processed by their 
firm in a year.  One exception was a local office of a large, nationwide THS corporation that 
reported claiming about 3 percent of all workers and also described a corporate contract in which 
a large number of workers were claimed, yielding more than $1 million in tax credits for the 
corporate office.   
 At the same time, the respondent who had detailed information on the value of the tax 
credits to his firm also reported that information on who qualified was kept confidential.  In fact, 
although three-quarters of the firms claiming tax credits indicated that a list of qualifying 
employees was kept at the firm, most respondents emphasized that it was an intentional practice 
that they did not know who qualified at the time of the hiring decision.  Only one respondent 
suggested that an individual’s eligibility might (positively) affect their hiring decision, and this 
person was careful to add that other information was more important.  Among the 26 firms that 
did not claim the credits, the most common reason offered (by 15) was that they did not have any 
eligible workers or enough eligible workers to make the paperwork worthwhile. 
 In summary, a key, overarching finding from the survey component of this study is that 
THS firms do not appear to be using the opportunity to claim tax credits for disadvantaged 
workers to deliberately increase the hiring of disadvantaged workers.  In general, they do not 
                                                 
38 The characteristics or qualifications most frequently mentioned (in order of highest frequency) were: ex-
felon and welfare recipient (44 percent), food stamp recipient (41 percent) and poor veteran and Supplemental 
Security Income recipient (23 percent). 
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have information about individuals’ status as qualifying (or not) for the tax credits at the time of 
hire, and even after hiring decisions are made, information about employees who are claimed is 
kept confidential. As one firm related in the telephone survey: “The information is sent to our 
corporate office, a third party processes the forms, and the tax credits come back to us like a 
bonus.”  In effect, the firms get “bonuses” for simply putting a form in their hiring packets and 
sending them off to be processed.  These findings are consistent with our empirical findings 
discussed earlier, suggesting that the WOTC does not improve the future labor market outcomes 
of disadvantaged workers. 
 
CONCLUSION  
 The objective of this paper is to identify the distinct effects of temporary employment and 
employer subsidies on the labor market outcomes of workers who are certified for these tax 
credit programs through their work for THS firms.  First, we find that simply comparing average 
employment outcomes of these workers to others who are either uncertified or nontemporary is 
not sufficient to understand the effects of the subsidy or of temporary work.  This is because 
characteristics like gender, age, race, and education level vary substantially between these 
groups.  We also find that employer characteristics, such as firm size, are important predictors of 
participation in the WOTC subsidy program, and therefore must be taken into account when 
assessing the effects of subsidies. 
When these worker and firm characteristics are used as conditioning variables in an 
analysis of the effects of WOTC certification on THS workers, we conclude that WOTC 
certification is associated with much higher quarterly earnings at the THS job but has little effect 
on job tenure.  We find no evidence of longer-term effects of having been WOTC-certified.  
When we restrict our analysis to WOTC-certified workers and examine the outcomes of THS 
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and non-THS workers, we find that those in THS employment have much shorter job tenure than 
those in traditional jobs, resulting in substantially lower earnings at the WOTC job.  It is not 
clear whether some improvements in labor market outcomes during the two years following the 
start of the THS job are enough to compensate for these lower earnings.   
Our findings lead to several conclusions.  Based on the raw data and cross-sectional 
estimates related to earnings and tenure at the relevant (THS or WOTC) job, we conclude that 
workers in the temporary help industry have higher earnings when subsidized (relative to 
unsubsidized THS workers), but given these subsidies, they still experience lower total earnings 
that those in traditional jobs due to the shorter job tenure in the THS industry.39  In our panel data 
analysis of labor market outcomes in all jobs during the two years following the relevant job 
start, we find no evidence of meaningful broader effects (positive or negative) of the WOTC 
subsidy or THS employment on labor force attachment or earnings at other jobs.40    
 These findings bear some similarities to those of other recent studies, although there is 
still no consensus among this research regarding the patterns of outcomes over time associated 
with THS employment.  Autor and Houseman (2005) employ a quasi-experimental research 
design that uses random assignment of welfare recipients to labor market intermediaries and 
compare welfare-to-work clients who entered temporary help service jobs with those in direct-
hire placements.  Although they found initial gains in both earnings and employment for those 
entering temporary employment, their subsequent total earnings (over a two-year period) are 
substantially lower than those of direct-hire workers, primarily because they worked less (or had 
                                                 
39 Our analysis implicitly assumes that it would be possible for THS workers to hold traditional jobs; we 
compare THS and traditional workers rather than comparing them to the unemployed. 
40 It is possible to assess the joint effect of both WOTC certification and THS employment on a given 
employment outcome (relative to a worker with neither) by simply adding the coefficients together for the two 
estimates, though this estimate is also statistically insignificant for all outcomes.  For example, the estimated 
coefficient on total wages at all jobs in the first year following the start of a WOTC-certified THS job would be 
based on the first rows in Tables 5 and 7: $310 + (−$247) = $63.  The standard error of this sum is $595, which 
indicates very low precision. 
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shorter tenure in their THS jobs).  Their point estimates, however, like ours, are not statistically 
significant for estimates over a longer time period.  Heinrich, Mueser, and Troske (2005) find 
that welfare recipients entering temporary help jobs received lower earnings and had less 
promising prospects for movement from welfare than those who had jobs in other industries, but 
that these differences were small after controlling for individual characteristics and became 
negligible over time as these workers’ earnings in subsequent years increased faster, possibly due 
to transitions to employment in other industries.  One point of tentative agreement appears to be 
that there is no strong evidence of substantial differences in earnings when labor market 
outcomes of these workers are examined over a longer period of time. 
The potentially positive effects of the WOTC on earnings combined with concerns about 
job tenure among THS workers suggest an interesting policy question: Would the goals of the 
WOTC program and the incentives it generates for employers be better aligned if the tax credits 
were made available to the client firm of the THS intermediary (rather than, or in addition to, the 
THS firm itself) upon the hire of the THS worker into a permanent position?  Under the current 
program, a client firm would need to submit a new WOTC application if it hired a temporary 
worker into a permanent position, and this application would only be accepted if the worker were 
still a member of a WOTC target group at the time of the transition.  Workers who left public 
assistance when they initially obtained the THS job may no longer have the recent welfare or 
food stamp receipt needed to qualify for the subsidy.  Because of this possibility, the client firm 
may lack an incentive to transition a worker to permanent employment.   
If we believed that THS firms were strategic in their employment of disadvantaged workers to 
claim these tax credits, we might also be concerned that THS firms would have an incentive to 
maintain workers’ temporary arrangements until they had worked the minimum number of hours 
for the WOTC to be claimed (i.e., delaying the transition to a permanent position).41  However, 
                                                 
41 An additional incentive is created by the subsidy cap: if the THS firm reaches the maximum credit it 
could claim for a worker in a given year (when a worker’s earnings reach $6,000), it may be more likely to 
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our survey of Wisconsin THS firms suggests that THS employers pay little attention to whom 
they are claiming or for how long.  Thus, the bigger public policy concern that our research 
raises is that it does not appear that the primary objective of these tax credits—to encourage 
employers to hire more disadvantaged workers—is being served by subsidizing temporary help 
services firms, which are among some of the largest claimants and beneficiaries of these tax 
credits. 
                                                                                                                                                             
substitute other workers for whom it could claim additional credits.  However, this cap is seldom reached.  In our 
WOTC-eligible sample of THS workers, average earnings at the THS job are only about $1,700, and over 90 percent 
of workers earn less than $6,000. 
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Table 1  Demographic Characteristics of WOTC-Eligible THS Workers   
 
Sample: All WOTC-eligible and WOTC-certified workers (via welfare or food stamps) who had THS jobs starting 
in 7/99–12/01 and who had some welfare or food stamp receipt in 1998–2001 (sample means).  
 
Characteristic Full sample
WOTC-eligible but 
uncertified workers
WOTC-certified 
workers 
Difference in 
means 
Gender N = 11,529 N = 11,052 N = 477  
Female 0.838 0.838 0.849 −0.015 
Race N = 11,529 N = 11,052 N = 477  
        White 0.131 0.123 0.286 −0.163*** 
        Black 0.588 0.594 0.444   0.150*** 
        Hispanic 0.096 0.098 0.067   0.031*** 
        Other race (non-white) 0.185 0.185 0.203 −0.018 
Education N = 11,289 N = 10,846 N =443  
        Less than high school 0.590 0.596 0.422   0.174*** 
        High school or equivalent 0.357 0.352 0.497 −0.145*** 
        Some college 0.052 0.051 0.079 −0.029** 
        College degree or higher 0.002 0.002 0.002   0.000 
Children N =11,480  N =11,033  N =447   
        Number of children < 18 in household 2.71 2.73 2.24   0.491*** 
        Number of children < 6 in household 1.49 1.49 1.26   0.237*** 
Age N = 11,522 N = 11,052 N = 470  
        Age in quarter of job start 24.9 24.9 25.2 −0.287 
Residence N = 11,458 N = 11,005 N = 453  
        Lives in Milwaukee 0.788 0.795 0.627   0.168*** 
Firm headquarters N = 11,529 N = 11,052 N = 477  
        Wisconsin 0.657 0.661 0.566   0.095*** 
Size of firm’s disadvantaged workforcea  N = 11,529 N =11,052 N = 477  
        Number of person-quarters worked 
        at firm in 2000:1–2003:2 
        by CARES sample  
18,487 18,597 15,923 2,674*** 
 
NOTES:  The set of WOTC-certified THS workers includes two groups: those who were certified under the welfare 
or food stamp target groups (even if we cannot confirm eligibility) OR who were certified under another group but 
were eligible for the welfare or food stamp group.  We limit the sample to those who received welfare or food 
stamps sometime during 1998–2001 since we have demographic data available for this subsample.  Our comparison 
group of WOTC-eligible but uncertified THS workers includes those who were eligible for the WOTC or WtW as 
members of the food stamp youth or welfare target groups.  (This reflects our inability to assess eligibility for the 
other target groups given the available data).  Demographic variables are available for this whole comparison group.  
Unemployment Insurance data are available for the entire sample.  Our final sample contains 477 WOTC-certified 
THS records and 11,052 WOTC-eligible but uncertified THS records. Mean differences are labeled: * if significant 
at 10%, ** if significant at 5%, and *** if significant at 1%. 
 
a We estimate “disadvantaged workforce size” by counting, for each firm, the number of person-quarter UI records 
(in 1999:1–2004:2) for workers who received welfare or food stamps in Wisconsin at some point in 1998–2001 (our 
CARES sample) or for whom the employer applied for WOTC certification. 
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Table 2A  Characteristics of WOTC-Certified Workers and their Jobs     
 
Sample: All WOTC certifications in Wisconsin for jobs starting in 1999–2002 (entries are population shares). 
 
Characteristic Full sample 
Workers 
employed in 
end-user 
firms 
Temporary help 
services (THS) 
workers 
Difference in 
means 
Firm headquarters N = 16,948 N = 14,254 N = 2,694  
      Wisconsin 51.3 51.0 52.7 −1.7 
Target group N = 16,785 N = 14,135 N = 2,650  
      Welfare (WOTC only) 9.9 10.6 6.5  4.1*** 
      WtW (or both WOTC and WtW)a 24.7 24.5 25.4 −0.91 
      Veteran 1.6 1.5 2.3 −0.84*** 
      Ex-felon 9.6 6.8 24.7 −17.9*** 
      High-risk youth (EZ/EC) 13.6 13.6 13.3 −0.36 
      Vocational rehabilitation 9.2 9.4 7.7  1.7*** 
      Summer youth 1.4 1.6 0.3  1.3*** 
      SSI 8.9 9.7 4.6  5.1*** 
      Food stamp youth (18–24) 21.2 22.3 15.3  7.0*** 
Starting wage N = 16,695 N = 14,056 N = 2,639  
      < Minimum wage 2.3 2.7 0  2.7*** 
      $5.15 – $5.99 23.5 26.7 6.4  20.3*** 
      $6.00 – $6.99 36.1 37.4 29.3  8.1*** 
      $7.00 – $7.99 17.4 15.9 25.4 −9.5*** 
      $8.00 – $8.99 12.6 10.5 23.8 −13.3*** 
      $9.00 and up 8.0 6.7 15.1 −8.4*** 
Occupational category N = 16,713 N = 14,073 N = 2,640  
      Clerical and sales 33.0 36.3 15.6   20.7***  
      Service 34.9 33.1 44.7 −11.6*** 
   Professional/technical/managerial 9.6 11.0 2.3   8.7*** 
      Farm/forestry/fishery 0.6 0.2 2.7 −2.5*** 
      Machine trades 1.4 1.1 3.0 −1.9*** 
      Other 20.5 18.4 31.7 −13.3*** 
 
NOTES:  The total number of worker-jobs in the WOTC records for this time period is 20,577.  Of these, 725 (about 
3.5 percent) did not have any UI records in 1999–2004 (including 27 whose records had not been requested from 
UI), and about 2,571 did not successfully match with a UI record for the WOTC job (either there was no UI record 
indicating the employer listed in the WOTC record or no record in the appropriate quarter that could be identified as 
the WOTC job).  We dropped these WOTC records, as well as those for which temporary work status was unknown 
(about 1.5 percent of the remaining sample).  The resulting sample, used for this table, contains 17,018 observations, 
of which 2,695 are THS jobs.  These reflect the records of 14,005 distinct individuals, some of which had more than 
one WOTC record during 1999–2002.  Separate sample sizes are given for each variable since some records have 
missing data for some variables.  Mean differences are labeled: * if significant at 10%, ** if significant at 5%, and 
*** if significant at 1%. 
 
a Workers who qualify for the WtW (which requires 18 months of welfare receipt) also qualify for the WOTC 
(which requires 9 months).  Employers can apply for both simultaneously, but can claim only one. 
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Table 2B  Demographic Characteristics of WOTC-Certified Workers        
 
Sample: All WOTC certifications in Wisconsin for workers with WOTC jobs starting in 7/99–12/01 who had some 
welfare or food stamp receipt in 1998–2001 (sample means). 
 
Characteristic Full sample 
Workers employed 
in end-user firms 
Temporary help 
services (THS) 
workers 
Difference in 
means 
Gender N = 6,374 N =5,693 N =681  
Female 0.803 0.816 0.695  0.121*** 
Race N =6,374  N =5,693  N =681   
        White 0.296 0.296 0.305 −0.009 
        Black 0.453 0.456 0.432   0.024 
        Hispanic 0.051 0.050 0.057 −0.007 
        Other race (nonwhite) 0.200 0.199 0.206   0.007 
Education N =5,490  N =4,928  N =562   
        Less than high school 0.500 0.510 0.413   0.097*** 
        High school or equivalent 0.422 0.415 0.489 −0.075*** 
        Some college 0.074 0.072 0.093 −0.021* 
        College degree or higher 0.004 0.003 0.005 −0.002 
Children N =5,614  N =5,039  N =575   
        Number of children < 18 in household 2.21 2.23 1.97   0.267 ***
        Number of children < 6 in household 1.23 1.24 1.09   0.156*** 
Age N =6,312 N = 5,643 N =669   
        Age in quarter of job start 25.4 25.2 27.0 −1.76*** 
Residence N =5,575  N =5,002  N =573   
        Lives in Milwaukee 0.630 0.631 0.621 0.010 
 
NOTES: These data are a subset of those used in Table 2A.  That data set had 17,018 observations.  We limit the 
sample to those starting a job in the period 7/99–12/01 and then keep only those workers who received welfare or 
food stamps sometime in 1998–2001, since we have demographic characteristics for this subset.  These restrictions 
result in a sample size of 6,374 person-jobs, of which 681 are THS jobs.  The total number of workers in the sample 
is 5,928.  Mean differences are labeled: * if significant at 10%, ** if significant at 5%, and *** if significant at 1%. 
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Table 3  Employment Outcomes in WOTC and THS Employment       
Sample: Jobs obtained by THS and/or WOTC workers, as used in Tables 1 and 2B. 
 
 
NOTES: This table contains sample means and standard deviations, by subgroup, using information from each record 
in Tables 1 and 2B, based on the UI data for the relevant job.  (The upper left cell uses the data on THS WOTC 
workers from Table 2B, which is a slightly larger sample than that in Table 1.)   
 
 
Job characteristics Temporary help services firm End-user firm 
WOTC-certified   
Quarters at job:  
 
 
Total earnings at job: 
 
 
Avg. earnings per quarter: 
 
2.03 
(1.51) 
 
$2,868 
(4,863) 
 
$1,079 
(963) 
3.07 
(3.33) 
 
$5,972 (13,636) 
 
$1,174 
(1,168) 
   
WOTC-eligible but not certified  
Quarters at job:  
 
 
Total earnings at job: 
 
 
Avg. earnings per quarter: 
1.80 
(1.40) 
 
$1,656 
(4,016) 
 
$643 
(822) 
— 
 
 
— 
 
 
— 
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Table 4  Propensity Score Estimation for Selection into WOTC Certification  
 
Sample: This sample is based on the sample of THS workers in Table 1.  We drop workers with more than one 
WOTC certification in the period 1996-early 2003 and workers with missing (and not easily imputed) data on the 
independent variables or with UI matches that have job start dates inconsistent with the WOTC records.  The last 
variable was constructed by assembling all records for the relevant firm that were in our data in the last year; all 
these workers’ earnings were added together and divided by the number of workers to get a sense of the usual 
earnings of workers at this firm.     
 
Variable Odds ratio Z-statistic 
Age 1.120*** 1.73 
Age squared 0.999 −1.35 
Female 1.108 0.57 
High school diploma 1.448*** 2.94 
Some college 1.510* 1.77 
College degree 1.372 0.30 
Black 0.423*** −5.11 
Hispanic 0.520** −2.65 
Other race (nonwhite) 0.723* −1.77 
Number of children under 6 0.765*** −4.46 
Number of children 6–17 0.934 −1.41 
Milwaukee resident 0.544*** −4.13 
Firm headquarters in Wisconsin 0.813* −1.73 
Size of disadvantaged workforce at firm (in 000s) 0.997 −0.89 
Last year’s average quarterly earnings/worker at firm 1.0007*** 6.97 
 
NOTES:  N = 10,962 (of which 320 are WOTC workers).  Estimated via logit; pseudo R2 = 0.101.  * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Quarter indicators and an intercept are also included in the 
estimation.  Omitted indicators: Education = Less than high school; Race = Caucasian.   
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Table 5  Effects of WOTC Certification on Wages and Tenure of THS workers 
 
 
NOTES: Standard errors are estimated via 100 bootstrap replications.  We match on log-odds ratios of the propensity 
score to account for choice-based sampling (see Smith and Todd 2005).  We use a bandwidth of 2, but point 
estimates with bandwidths of 0.5, 1, 3, and 4 are all quite similar.  We also use 2% trimming of the treated 
individuals to address common support concerns, as described in Todd (1999).  The measures with “year following” 
do not include the quarter in which the job started.  Sample sizes are smaller than in Table 1 due to additional 
restrictions regarding missing data and multiple records.  Panel estimates use a slightly smaller data set because we 
drop those who were under age 16 two years before the relevant job start. 
 
Sample Size:  Ntreatment = 314,  Ncomparison = 10,642  
 
 
Outcome of interest Effect of WOTC certification 
Total wages (all jobs) in first year following THS job start $310 (425) 
Total wages (all jobs) in second year following THS job start $333 (461) 
Total quarters employed in first year following THS job start  0.071  (0.099) 
Total quarters employed in second year following THS job start 0.141 (0.114) 
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Table 6  Propensity Score Estimation for Selection into THS Employment 
 
Sample: All WI workers who were WOTC/WtW certified for a job starting in 7/99–12/01 and who had welfare or 
food stamp receipt sometime in 1998–2001.  We drop workers with more than one WOTC certification in the period 
1996–early 2003 and workers with missing (and not easily imputed) data on the independent variables or with UI 
matches that have job start dates inconsistent with the WOTC records.   
 
Variable Odds Ratio Z-statistic 
Age 1.082* 1.75 
Age squared 0.999 −1.56 
Female 0.738** −2.12 
High school diploma 1.307** 2.38 
Some college 1.404* 1.73 
College degree 1.643 0.69 
Black 0.932 −0.47 
Hispanic 1.224 0.83 
Other face (nonwhite) 1.186 1.04 
Number of children under 6 0.937 −1.21 
Number of children 6–17 0.986 −0.32 
Milwaukee resident 1.089 0.64 
Target group = Poor veteran 1.797* 1.82 
Target group = Ex-felon 3.026*** 4.14 
Target group = (EZ/EC) high risk youth  1.635** 2.03 
Target group = Vocational rehabilitation 0.646 −1.23 
Target group = Food stamp youth (ages 18–24) 1.295 1.35 
Target group = SSI 0.816 −0.72 
Target group = WtW 1.333* 1.61 
Size of disadvantaged workforce at firm (in 000s) 0.991*** −3.97 
Occupation: clerical/sales 2.053** 2.19 
Occupation: service 6.413*** 5.81 
Occupation: other 7.412*** 6.21 
 
NOTES: N = 3,978 (of which 453 are THS workers).  Estimated via logit; pseudo R2 = 0.102.  * significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Quarter indicators and an intercept are also included in the estimation. 
Omitted indicators: Education = Less than high school; Race = Caucasian; Target Group = Welfare; Occupation = 
professional/technical/managerial. 
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Table 7  Effects of THS Employment on Wages and Tenure of WOTC workers 
 
Outcome of Interest Effect of THS Job 
Total wages (all jobs) in first year following WOTC job start −$247 (417) 
Total wages (all jobs) in second year following WOTC job start $589 (501) 
Total quarters employed in first year following WOTC job start  −0.086  (0.094) 
Total quarters employed in second year following WOTC job start 0.164 (0.118) 
 
NOTES: Standard errors are estimated via 100 bootstrap replications.  We use a bandwidth of 0.20, but results with 
bandwidths of 0.10, 0.15, 0.30, and 0.40 are all quite similar.  Wages are recoded from categories (approximately $1 
wide) using the midpoints of the range for each category.  The measures with “year following” do not include the 
quarter in which the job started.  Panel estimates use a slightly smaller data set because we drop those who were 
under age 16 two years before the relevant job start. 
 
Sample Size: Ntreatment = 444,  Ncomparison = 3,525 
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APPENDIX 
 
ASSEMBLING DATA SETS FOR TABLES 1, 2A, 2B 
 
 
Tables 2A and 2B  
Sample assembly is straightforward to explain if we begin with Tables 2A and 2B.  The total 
number of worker-jobs in the WOTC records in 1999–2002 is 20,577.  The sample is then 
matched first to the UI data for the certified jobs (resulting in the sample for Table 2A) and then 
linked to further demographic information for the subset of these workers who had welfare or 
food stamp receipt sometime during 1998–2001 (Table 2B).  The details are as follows: 
 
A few of these 20,577 were missing from our UI data request. 
* DROP 27 records 
 
• Remaining: N = 20,550 
 
Some workers in the WOTC records had no UI records at all in 1999–2004. 
* DROP 698 records 
 
• Remaining: N = 19,852 
 
Some workers had UI records but none in the appropriate quarter or with the appropriate 
employer. 
* DROP 305 records 
 
• Remaining: N = 19,547 
 
Some workers had records in UI in the correct quarter, but they were either labeled as a different 
employer or had multiple jobs so that it was impossible to match to the WOTC job. 
* DROP 1739 records 
 
• Remaining: N = 17,808 
 
Some workers had a record matching the correct employer, but the job start date reported in 
WOTC was more than one quarter away from the job start date reported in UI. 
* DROP 527 records 
 
• Remaining:  N = 17,281 
 
Some jobs were not identifiable as “temporary help” or “non-temporary help”. 
* DROP 263 records 
 
• Final sample size for Table 2A: N = 17,018  (of these, 2,695 are THS jobs) 
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Table 2B keeps only those within the Table 2A sample who received welfare or food stamps 
sometime in 1998–2001 (this is the group for which demographic characteristics are available). 
  
• Final sample size for Table 2B: N = 6,374  (of these, 681 are THS jobs) 
 
 
Table 1 
 
Assembling the sample for Table 1 was done in two parts: first assembling the treatment group 
(WOTC-certified THS workers) and then assembling the comparison group (WOTC-eligible but 
uncertified THS workers).  Note that only eligibility via welfare or food stamps can be 
established with these data. 
 
Treatment group: 
 
We began with the WOTC-eligible THS workers assembled in Table 2B (N = 681). 
 
Because these workers are to be compared to a group of workers who are WOTC-eligible based 
on their welfare or food stamp receipt, we would like the treatment group to contain comparable 
workers.  For instance, if some of the WOTC-certified THS workers were claimed based on ex-
felon status, and were not eligible for WOTC under a welfare/food stamp category, we would 
prefer not to use them in the comparison.  We thus drop workers if both (a) they appear ineligible 
for WOTC via their welfare or food stamp records and (b) they were claimed for WOTC under a 
non-welfare/food stamp target group.  Equivalently, we keep those who appear eligible via 
welfare/food stamps OR at least were claimed under a welfare/food stamp category (even if we 
don’t find them to be eligible; we effectively assume that the authorities granting the certification 
are better able to establish eligibility than we are).   
* DROP 204 records 
 
• Final Treatment Group for Table 1:  N = 477 
 
 
Comparison Group: 
 
We begin with the CARES data, and we identify all persons who became eligible for the WOTC 
(via welfare or food stamp receipt) during 7/99–12/01.  This initial sample is 44,018 people.  
However, these people could only truly qualify for the WOTC if they began a job during the time 
they were eligible.  We therefore match them to UI records, where we find no job records for 
10,347 of these individuals during 7/99–12/01.  Note that this does not indicate failure of the 
merge between datasets.  Rather, most of those who are unmatched are likely to be out of the 
labor force, and thus legitimately missing UI records.  We only want workers in our comparison 
group, so these people are intentionally excluded rather than being dropped due to a failure to 
merge with UI. 
 
The remaining individuals have a total of 124,848 person-job records during this time period.  
However, not all of these jobs began in a quarter during which the worker was eligible to be 
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claimed for the WOTC.  We therefore trim the sample down to the 48,872 person-job records for 
which a new job began during a quarter in which the worker was WOTC eligible.  Some 
individuals obtain more than one new job during their time of WOTC eligibility, and each record 
is included here. 
 
• Remaining: N = 48,872 
 
We then remove records that are not THS jobs. 
* DROP 36,535 
 
• Remaining: N = 12,337 
 
There are some duplicate records in the sample (same worker ID, employer ID, and same first 
quarter of work).  We assume these are referring to the same job and just keep one copy of each. 
* DROP 206 
 
• Remaining: N = 12,131 
 
Some UI records do not contain sufficient information to identify whether a firm is THS or not. 
* DROP 1079 
 
Final Comparison Group for Table 1:  N = 11,052
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Table A.1  Balancing Test Results for Selection into THS Employment 
 
Mean of Conditioning 
Variable 
Conditioning variable Sample Treatment Comparison 
Test results: initial bias and % 
reduction in bias after matching 
p-value 
(matched)
Unmatched 27.329 26.069 % initial bias 15.6 age 
Matched 27.137 27.118 % reduction in bias 98.4 
0.972 
Unmatched 0.731 0.856 % initial bias −31.3 female 
Matched 0.746 0.746 % reduction in bias 99.7 
0.99 
Unmatched 1.706 1.616 % initial bias 13.8 education 
Matched 1.694 1.701 % reduction in bias 92 
0.87 
Unmatched 0.435 0.469 % initial bias −6.9 black 
Matched 0.435 0.432 % reduction in bias 92.3 
0.937 
Unmatched 0.060 0.052 % initial bias 3.5 Hispanic 
Matched 0.059 0.057 % reduction in bias 81.9 
0.927 
Unmatched 0.196 0.168 % initial bias 7.3 other race 
Matched 0.196 0.196 % reduction in bias 99.1 
0.992 
Unmatched 1.042 1.255 % initial bias −19.4 total kids under 6 
Matched 1.049 1.062 % reduction in bias 94 
0.86 
Unmatched 0.896 0.901 % initial bias −0.4 total kids 6-17 
Matched 0.910 0.902 % reduction in bias −57.4 
0.93 
Unmatched 0.607 0.609 % initial bias −0.4 Milwaukee 
Matched 0.606 0.600 % reduction in bias −255.7 
0.852 
Unmatched 15.826 23.430 % initial bias −32 firm “size” in 000s 
Matched 15.949 16.777 % reduction in bias 89.1 
0.538 
Unmatched 5.943 6.214 % initial bias −9.5 WOTC target group 
Matched 6.002 5.963 % reduction in bias 85.7 
0.839 
Unmatched 3.119 2.552 % initial bias 65.7 
occupation 
Matched 3.106 3.038 % reduction in bias 87.9 
0.221 
 
NOTES: This balancing test follows the propensity score matching estimation of THS employment effects.  The 
interpretation of the p-values is that low values (such as those below 0.10 or 0.05) suggest that there is remaining 
selection bias for a given variable even after matching. 
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Table A.2  Balancing Test Results for Selection into WOTC Certification 
 
Mean of conditioning 
variable 
Conditioning variable Sample Treatment Comparison 
Test results: initial bias and % 
reduction in bias after matching 
p-value 
(matched)
Unmatched 25.812 25.044 % initial bias 11.1age 
Matched 25.735 25.668 % reduction in bias 91.4
0.908 
Unmatched 0.84688 0.84937 % initial bias −0.7female 
Matched 0.84395 0.84699 % reduction in bias −22.1
0.916 
Unmatched 1.6719 1.46 % initial bias 34.3education 
Matched 1.6656 1.6698 % reduction in bias 98
0.935 
Unmatched 0.39687 0.60083 % initial bias −41.6black 
Matched 0.40446 0.39325 % reduction in bias 94.5
0.775 
Unmatched 0.075 0.09688 % initial bias −7.8Hispanic 
Matched 0.07643 0.07524 % reduction in bias 94.5
0.955 
Unmatched 0.20313 0.17741 % initial bias 6.5other race 
Matched 0.20701 0.20059 % reduction in bias 75.1
0.842 
Unmatched 1.1844 1.514 % initial bias −28.5total kids under 6 
Matched 1.1911 1.2213 % reduction in bias 90.8
0.726 
Unmatched 1.0313 1.2035 % initial bias −11.5total kids 6-17 
Matched 1.0287 1.0178 % reduction in bias 93.7
0.924 
Unmatched 0.58437 0.79525 % initial bias −46.8Milwaukee 
Matched 0.59554 0.57733 % reduction in bias 91.4
0.644 
Unmatched 0.5625 0.66162 % initial bias −20.4firm headquarters in WI 
Matched 0.56688 0.57038 % reduction in bias 96.5
0.93 
Unmatched 15.048 18.806 % initial bias −22.3firm “size” in 000s 
Matched 14.87 14.923 % reduction in bias 98.6
0.965 
Unmatched 1324 1027.1 % initial bias 75.7avg. earnings/quarter at 
firm last year Matched 1316 1273.9 % reduction in bias 85.8
0.265 
 
NOTES: This balancing test follows the propensity score matching estimation of WOTC certification effects.  The 
interpretation of the p-values is that low values (such as those below 0.10 or 0.05) suggest that there is remaining 
selection bias for a given variable even after matching. 
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